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This paper studies the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the
context of a simple two-country model of trade. In addition to its usual
e¤ects, a transfer of income in one period is assumed to in‡uence the prefer-
ences of the recipient country in the following period. The implied changes
in the terms of trade over the two periods are consistent with a number of
possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of the donor, the
recipient, and the world as a whole. Particular attention is devoted to the
conditions for strict Pareto improvement and the circumstances under which
temporary aid transactions are likely to occur.
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The theoretical literature on international transfer payments emerged from
the discussion on whether the reparations made by Germany after WWI
would cause a deterioration or an improvement in its terms of trade. The
debate eventually led to the question of whether the terms of trade of the
paying country can improve so much that it actually bene…ts by paying a
transfer. In a setting without distortions, it was demonstrated by Samuelson
(1947) that such an outcome is ruled out if the model exhibits Walrasian
stability. It was subsequently shown that, in the presence of distortions, a
donor-enriching transfer can occur even if the markets are stable.1
Most of the literature on the welfare implications of transfers in the pres-
ence of distortions has evolved within the static framework of analysis.2 This
concentration on static models overlooks one potentially important distor-
tion: possible existence of imperfections in the international capital markets
or outright barriers to lending and borrowing between rich and poor nations.
One of the contributions of the present study is to illustrate the role of such
barriers in the welfare analysis of foreign aid transactions.
Another element which may be important in the analysis of foreign aid,
yet neglected in static models, is the possibility that aid may have e¤ects
which manifest themselves only later on in time. In some cases aid may serve
to increase the donor’s in‡uence over foreign as well as domestic policies of
the recipient. Exercise of such in‡uence can yield signi…cant future bene…ts
1for the donor.3 Similarly, aid in the form of infrastructure projects, technical
assistance and training programs can alter the recipient country’s production
possibilities over time in a way that increases future demand for the donor’s
exports or raises the future supply of its imports. Another possibility is
that a transfer of aid in one period may, as a result of habit-formation or
“good-will” e¤ects, cause a shift in preferences of the recipient country in the
following period. Aid can then be seen as an instrument with the power to
in‡uence future consumption of the recipient in a direction that is bene…cial
to the donor.4
In studying the welfare implications of foreign aid transactions in the
presence of such links between the present and the future, we need to specify
the mechanism that enables the donor country to possibly bene…t from aid.
While our point can be made most convincingly by focusing on the in‡uence
of aid on foreign and domestic policies of the recipient country or its future
production possibilities, we wish to minimize the complexity of our argument
by choosing the very simple case in which the preferences of consumers of the
recipient country are a¤ected by aid. We utilize a basic two-country, two-
period model of trade, where aid is given only in the …rst period. If we con-
…ne our analysis strictly to this …rst period, the standard (non-paradoxical)
results emerge with the donor country losing and the recipient country ben-
e…ting from the transfer. However, a look at the two economies over time
reveals other possibilities. Due to either the ”good will” impact of aid or
habit formation, the aid-related increase in the recipient’s consumption in
2the …rst period is transmitted to the next, generating a period-two terms-
of-trade e¤ect. Under certain conditions, this e¤ect improves the donor’s
welfare in the second period at the expense of the recipient, giving rise to
a number of possible outcomes with respect to the intertemporal welfare of
the donor, the recipient, and the world as a whole. The paper proceeds to
derive the conditions for world welfare improvement and individual country
(strict Pareto) welfare improvement.
The case of strict Pareto improvement is of particular signi…cance. It
is consistent with the notion that the acts of giving and receiving aid are
voluntary. The principal objective of the paper is to analyse the conditions
for strict Pareto improvement and provide insights related to the circum-
stances under which temporary aid transactions are likely to occur. It is
argued that temporary aid may serve as a vehicle for ”intertemporal” trade
between economies with di¤erent discount rates when other, more e¢cient
mechanisms for international lending and borrowing are not available.
2 The Framework of Analysis
Let us consider a two-period model in which two countries exchange in each
period two goods. International lending and borrowing is assumed to be
prohibited.5 In what follows, we use capital letters for …rst-period variables,
lower case letters for second- period variables and an asterisk (¤) for the
variables of the foreign country. In our analysis of a transfer, it is assumed
that the foreign country is the donor, home country is the recipient, and the
3transfer is temporary in the sense that it occurs only in period one. The
transfer is …nanced in the foreign country by means of a lump-sum tax and
distributed in the home country in the form of a lump-sum subsidy.
The budget constraints and the commodity-market equilibrium condition
pertaining to the …rst period are described belowusing standard expenditure
(E) and revenue (R) functions, where the relative price of the non-numeraire
good (P) and the domestic and foreign utility levels (U and U¤) enter as
arguments:






P(1;P;U¤) = RP(1;P)+ R¤
P(1;P): (3)
Equations (1) and (2) are the budget constraints for the representative con-
sumer in each country, re‡ecting a transfer amounting to T units of the
numeraire from the foreign to the home country. Equation (3) is the market-
clearing condition for the non-numeraire good, equalizing the world demand
to the world supply.6 The market-clearing condition for the numeraire good
is omitted due to Walras’ Law.
In the second period there are no transfers and the two countries only
exchange goods with each other. However, we assume that there is an in-
tertemporal consumption externality that allows …rst period aid to a¤ect
the recipient’s preferences in the second period.7 The aid-induced increase
in period-one consumption of the non-numeraire good, which we take to be
4the donor’s export good, is assumed to shift the recipient’s second-period
preferences in favor of that commodity. This shift may re‡ect a number of
di¤erent phenomena related to a transfer of aid. One possibility is that aid
given in period one contributes to an atmosphere of ‘good will’ which may be
instrumental in attracting consumers of the recipient country to the donor’s
export good in period two. Alternatively, the aid-related increase in period-
one consumption of the donor’s export good may, due to increased exposure
to and familiarity with that good, have a similar e¤ect on the recipient’s
preferences in the second period. In what follows, we describe the process
more precisely and refer to it as ‘habit formation’.8
The equilibrium conditions for thesecondperiod can bewrittenasfollows:
e(1;p;u;EP) = r(1;p); where e1E < 0; epE > 0: (4)








¤) = rp(1;p) +r
¤
p(1;p): (6)
As indicated in (4), due to habit formation, an increase in the period-one
consumption of the non-numeraire good tends to shift the period-two expen-
diture of the recipient (at any given level of utility and prices) away from
the numeraire commodity and towards the non-numeraire.10 Equations (5)
and (6) are, respectively, the period-two budget constraint for the foreign
country and the market-clearing condition for the non-numeraire commodity
in period two.
5Finally, the intertemporal utility functions for the two countries W(U;u)
and W¤(U¤;u¤) are assumed to take the following form:












where ± and ±
¤ are the (constant) rates of time preference of the recipient
and the donor country, respectively. Equations (1) to (8) can be solved
for the eight endogenous variables of the model (U;U¤;u;u¤;W;W¤;P;p) as
functions of T.11
The next section examines the implications for these variables of a small
change in T.
3 The E¤ects of Aid
Total di¤erentiation of (1) and (2) yields:
EUdU = ¡MdP + dT (9)
E¤
UdU¤ = MdP ¡ dT (10)
where M = EP ¡RP (= ¡M¤) is the recipient’s excess demand for the non-
numeraire good whichwe assume tobepositive. Thus, for eachcountry there
is an indirect terms-of-trade e¤ect and a direct income e¤ect of a transfer.
With the aid of (1)-(3), the former e¤ect can be related to the transfer as
follows:
~ ZdP = (C
¤
Y ¡ CY)dT; (11)
6where ~ Z = Z+Z¤¡MCY +MC¤
Y < 0 is the Walrasian stability condition for
the …rst period equilibrium;12 CY ´ EPU=EU > 0 (thus PCY is the marginal
propensity to consume the non-numeraire commodity in the …rst period),
and Z = EPP ¡ RPP < 0 is the (inverse of the) slope of the compensated
excess demand function for the non-numeraire good in the recipient country.
C¤
Y and Z¤ are similarly de…ned. Equation (11) con…rms the standard result
that the donor’s terms-of-trade improve if and only if the recipient’s marginal
propensity to consume the non-numeraire commodity is larger than that of
the donor, i.e., dP=dT > 0 if and only if C¤
Y ¡ CY < 0.











dT > 0: (13)
Thus, regardless of the magnitude and direction of the terms-of-trade e¤ect,
in a stable world economy, aid always bene…ts the recipient and harms the
donor in the …rst period. In other words, the transfer paradox cannot occur
in this one-period world.
However, the transfer in the …rst period also has a second period e¤ect
due to habit formation. Having assumed that eE = 0, welfare is a¤ected only
through changes in second-period prices.13 From (4) and (5) we obtain:




¤ = mdp (15)
7where m = ep¡rp = ¡m¤ > 0 is the recipient’s second period excess demand
function for the non-numeraire commodity.
From (6), and using (14) and (15), we can solve for the second period
terms-of-trade e¤ect relating dp to dEP. With the aid of (3) and (11) to
(13), we can then express dEP as a function of dT to obtain:






Y ¡ CY)]dT (16)
where ~ z = z + z¤ ¡ mcy + mc¤
y < 0 is the stability condition in the second
period, cy ´ eup=eu > 0 (so that pcy is the second period marginal propensity
to consume the non-numeraire good), and z = epp ¡ rpp < 0 is the (inverse
of the) slope of the second period compensated excess demand function,
with similar notation used for the foreign country. Assuming that the non-
numeraire good is normal, the bracketed term on the right hand side is
negative.14 The existence of the habit formation e¤ect (epE > 0) then results
in a terms-of-trade improvement for the donor in period two, i.e. dp=dT > 0.
Recalling equations (14) and (15), it follows that a grant of aid in the …rst
period bene…ts the donor and harms the recipient in the second period.
In order to simplify the notation in what follows, let us write (16) as







Y ¡ CY)] > 0; (17)
assuming normality of the non-numeraire commodity. The value of H mea-
sures the impact of a unit transfer in period one on the recipient’s demand
for the non-numeraire good in period two at any given value of p.
8It remains to determine the e¤ect of a transfer on the intertemporal wel-
fare of the two economies. What we know so far is that the recipient gains in
the …rst period and loses in the second period, while the opposite happens to
the donor country. Di¤erentiating (7) and (8) and using (12)-(17) we derive


































are the market-clearing real rates of interest at home and abroad. Due to
the assumed absence of international lending and borrowing, ½ is generally
not equal to ½¤.
3.1 Potential Pareto improvement
Having derived the basic welfare equations, we shall now examine the neces-
sary and su¢cient conditions for aid to be: (i) potentially Pareto improving,
in the sense of increasing the sum of the individual country welfare, (ii)
strictly Pareto improving, and (iii) donor enriching and recipient immiseriz-
ing.
We startwiththe case ofworld welfare improvement, i.e., potential Pareto




















Since mH=~ z < 0, Proposition 1 follows directly from the above equation.
Proposition 1: In the presence of habit formation, as de…ned above, an
income transfer between countries increases world welfare if and only if the









> 0 i¤ ½ > ½¤:
The intuition behind this result is rather simple. What matters for
world welfare are only the gains and loses in the second period. This is
because the …rst-period welfare changes of the two countries sum to zero
(see (12) and (13)). In period two we know that the donor gains and the
recipient loses and that the undiscounted sum of the two equals zero (see
(14) and (15)). However, in the presence of international borrowing and
lending constraints, the real rates of interest are generally di¤erent in the
two economies, i.e. ½ 6= ½¤, making the discounted value of the gains and
loses di¤erent. Obviously, ifthe donor country hasa lower real rate ofinterest
than the recipient, the discounted gains enjoyed by the donor in period two
arelarger thanthediscounted loses ofthe recipient, givingrise toa possibility
of a potential Pareto improvement due to a transfer.15
103.2 Strict Pareto improvement
When it comes to transactions involving temporary aid, the condition under
which there is a strict Pareto improvement, allowing both the donor and the
recipient to bene…t, is of particularinterest. Itis the only caseconsistent with
the presumption that both parties engage in the transaction on a voluntary
basis. Recalling equations (18) and (19), we arrive at Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: In the presence of habit formation, as de…ned above, an
income transfer results in a strict Pareto improvement, i.e. dW=dT > 0 and
dW¤=dT > 0, if and only if the following relation holds:
1






(Z +Z¤)= ~ Z
¡mH=~ z
> 0:
The variable A, de…ned in proposition 2, is the ratio of the recipient’s …rst
period gain to the current value of the second period loss associated with the
transfer. Correspondingly, from the point of viewof the donor, A is the ratio
of the period-one loss to the current value of the period-two gain.
In assessing the possible range of magnitude of A, we note that the
value of the numerator is positive (assuming stability), but could be either
greater or smaller than unity, depending on whether the period-one terms-
of-trade e¤ect favors the recipient or the donor. In the denominator, H
11measures the impact of a unit transfer in period one on the recipient’s de-
mand for the non-numeraire good in period two at any given value of p. As
noted earlier, assuming the non-numeraire commodity is normal, H > 0.
Moreover, it is proportional to the magnitude of the habit-formation e¤ect
(epE). Finally, the expression ¡m=~ z measures the decline in current income
of the home country in period two as a result of the terms-of-trade deteriora-
tion caused by a (habit-induced) unit increase in its period-two demand for
the non-numeraire good. This expression is positive, assuming stability, and
is larger in magnitude the greater the volume of non-numeraire imports of
the recipient country in period two and the lower the price elasticity of the
uncompensatedworld excess demandfor that same commodity. Accordingly,
A can be either smaller or larger than unity.
Let us now turn to condition (21) as a whole and ask under what
particular circumstances is it likely to be satis…ed. Clearly, the likelihood
of a potential aid project satisfying this criteria is larger, the larger the gap
between the real rates of interest of the two countries. A given aid project
which is bene…cial to the donor, satisfying 1=(1+ ½¤) > A is more likely to
bene…t the recipient, the higher the real rate of interest in the recipient coun-
try, i.e., the greater the scarcity of present goods in relation to the expected
scarcity of future goods. In reality this type of environment is typically ob-
served in less developed countries following a crop failure (or some other
natural or man-made disaster) which suddenly creates a shortage of present
goods. Lack of marketable assets that can be traded internationally prevents
12the a‡icted economy in such cases from acquiring goods from abroad, ex-
cept through aid. Each unit of aid is then precious to the recipient, at least
in relation to a unit of output in the future when production is expected to
return to normal. That is, disasters experienced by populations lacking trad-
able assets drive the real rate of interest to high levels, approaching in…nity
in some extreme cases. But then A is necessarily greater than 1=(1 + ½),
making the recipient of temporary aid better o¤, even if the current value of
the period-two loss is very large in relation to the period-one gain.16
This disaster environment (or any other disturbance which generates
a sharp increase in an economy’s real rate of interest) presents an ideal op-
portunity for a potential donor country with a low real rate of interest to
o¤er temporary aid in exchange for ‘future income’. The modality of shifting
future income back from the recipient to the donor can take many di¤erent
forms. It may involve future trade liberalization by the recipient country
or other forms of cooperation, including those with economic, political or
military dimensions. One mode that is consistent with the traditional ap-
proachto the transfer problem and with the example developed in this paper,
involves a period-two terms of trade improvement for the donor as tempo-
rary aid helps cultivate a friendly and receptive market for its exports in the
recipient country.
Corresponding to these bene…ts of the donor are the period-two losses
of the recipient which have a low present value when discounted using the
recipient’s high real rate of interest. From this perspective, temporary aid is
13essentially a vehicle for exchanging present for future income between coun-
tries with di¤erent discount rates when other more e¢cient mechanisms for
intertemporal trade are absent.
4 Concluding Remarks
This paper examines the welfare implications of temporary foreign aid in the
context of an intertemporal model of trade. The intertemporal framework
has the virtue of enabling us to consider the case where the net bene…ts of
an aid transfer may change over time for both the donor and the recipient.
Explicit consideration of time also brings into focus issues related to the
international credit market. An important share of foreign aid goes from
the rich to poor countries which are separated by barriers to international
lending and borrowing. Such barriers, while obviously overlooked in a static
setting, constitute a distortion which plays an important role in the welfare
analysis of temporary transfers.
The present study considers these intertemporal dimensions of the
transfer problem in the context of a two-period, two-country model of trade.
Assuming stability, a temporary transfer ofincomeinthe…rst period is shown
to increase period-one welfare of the recipient and lower that of the donor.
However, in the presence of habit formation or ‘good will’ e¤ects, period-one
aid may serve to shift preferences of the recipient in favor of the donor’s
export good in period two. The terms-of-trade e¤ect associated with this
shift improves the second-period welfare of the donor at the expense of the
14recipient. When the e¤ect is su¢ciently large and the real rate of interest
su¢ciently low, the donor’s period-two gain dominates its period-one loss.
The same transaction can also result in a net increase in welfare of
the recipient country, provided the real rate of interest used to discount the
period-two loss is su¢ciently high, making its present value smaller than the
period-one gain. From this perspective, temporary aid is seen as a vehicle for
‘intertemporal’ trade between economies with di¤erent discount rates when
other more e¢cient mechanisms for international lending and borrowing are
absent. By contrast, if the real rates of interest are equalized across countries,
a temporary transfer which shifts income from the donor to the recipient in
one period and in the opposite direction (via the terms-of-trade e¤ect) in the
next, has no power to generate a welfare improvement in the world economy
as a whole. This rules out the possibility of both countries bene…ting from
a temporary aid transaction. Our conclusions, however, require appropriate
modi…cation in a more general setting where the donor enjoys satisfaction
from the act of the transfer itself or when the transfer serves to overcome the
e¤ects of some other distortion, thereby improving the e¢ciency of produc-
tion or consumption in one or both economies.
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18Notes 1Kemp (1992) surveys a range of issues related to the transfer paradox and provides
references to the literature. See also Bhagwati, Brecher and Hatta (1983, 1985) for a lucid
discussion on the role of distortions in the analysis of the transfer problem.
2The exceptions are Galor and Polemarchakis (1987) and Haaparanta (1989), which
employ an overlapping generations model. See also Djaji´ c, Lahiri and Raimondos-Møller
(1999) for an intertemporal analysis of transfers in the context of a two-sector model with
endogenous investment.
3While the theoretical literature regards donor-enriching transfers as paradoxical, em-
pirical evidence seems to suggest that bilateral foreign aid transactions are typically mo-
tivated by donor’s foreign policy and commercial interests, rather than by the needs of
the recipient. According to the UNDP Human Development Report for 1994, “Bilateral
donors direct only 7% of their aid to such priority areas as basic education, primary health
care, rural water supplies, nutrition programs and family planning services” (p.73). Em-
pirical studies that attempt to test the validity of donor-interest and recipient-need models
of foreign aid distribution, (Maizels and Nissanke, 1984; McKinlay and Little, 1978, 1979),
broadly conclude that aid ‡ows primarily re‡ect donor’s interests rather than the needs
of the recipients.
4Arvin and Baum (1997), Arvin and Choudhry (1997), and Arvin et al. (2000) provide
theoretical analysis and empiricalevidence suggestingthat donors maintain a‡ow of untied
aid to replenish the stock of “good-will” that facilitates the sale of its exports in the
recipient country. This parallels the notion in the marketing literature that corporate
sponsorship of sporting and cultural events is an e¤ective way of promoting sales.
5This assumption of zero international borrowing and lending is no doubt an extreme
one. Admittedly, in reality one …nds imperfections in the international capital market,
but only rarely the complete absence of it. As reported in the IMF’s 1996 Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, of the 179 members, 127 were
maintaining formal restrictions on payments for capital transactions. Various problems
associated with sovereign debt, for example, can also prevent equalization of interest rates
between countries (see the survey by Eaton and Fernandez, 1995). There are cases, how-
ever, of economies undergoing extreme international payments di¢culties, for one reason
or another, which raise the lender’s risk to levels that preclude any voluntary lending from
19foreign sources. Because of these …nancial di¢culties, such economies are typically also
recipients of foreign aid.
6Partial derivative of the revenue (expenditure) function with respect to price gives the
supply (compensated demand) function for the good.
7A potential source for this intertemporal consumption externality could be swithcing
costs. For an analysis of consumer switching costs and its application to international
economics see Froot and Klemperer (1989) and Klemperer (1995).
8Mansoorian (1993) and Obstfeld (1992) are recent examples of interest in the impli-
cations of habit formation for macro behavior and economic policy.
9The recipient country’s expenditure function for period 2 can be derived in the fol-
lowing way. Let f(g1(c1;C2);g2(c2;C2)) be the utility function in period 2 where ci is the
consumption of good i in period 2, C2(= EP) is the consumption of good 2 in period 1,
and the sub-utility functions g1(¢) and g2(¢) satisfy the conditions @2g1=(@c1@C2) < 0 and
@2g2=(@c2@C2) > 0. The restrictions on the sub-utlility functions ensure that an increase
in C2 increases the marginal utility of consumption of good 2, and reduces that of good
1, in period 2. The expenditure function e(1;p;u;EP) is then de…ned by:
e(1;p;u;EP) = min
c1; c2
fc1 + p2c2 subject to f (g1 (c1;EP);g2 (c2;EP)) ¸ ug:
Two of the restrictions imposed on the second-period expenditure function in (4), viz.
e1E < 0; epE > 0, are satis…ed because of the assumptions made above on the sub-utility
function g1(¢) and g2(¢). The other two restrictions, viz. eE = 0; euE = 0 are assumed to
be satis…ed only in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium. These restrictions enable us to
focus on the ‘habit-formation’ or ‘good-will’ e¤ect by assuming away any other e¤ect of
C2 on utility in period 2.
10Alternatively, if we were to model the ‘good will’ e¤ect of period-one aid, we would
write (4) as ~ e(1;p;u;T) = r(1;p) where ~ eT = ~ euT = 0 and ~ e1T < 0;~ epT > 0.
11Our model may be presented in a somewhat di¤erent, although equivalent form, which
shows explicitly the role of the real rate of interest in each country in equalising income to
expenditure in each period. With a weakly separable intertemporal utility function, our
20model can be rewritten as follows:
~ E(1;P;~ ½;~ ½p;W) = R(1;P ) + ~ ½r(1;p) + T;
~ E¤(1;P;~ ½¤;~ ½¤p;W ¤) = R¤(1;P ) + ~ ½¤r¤(1;p) ¡ T;
~ E2 + ~ E
¤
2 = R2 + R
¤
2; ~ E4 + ~ E
¤
4 = r2 + r
¤
2;
~ E1 + P ~ E2 = R(1;P ) + T; ~ E
¤




where ~ ½ ´ 1=(1 + ½) and ~ ½¤ ´ 1=(1 + ½¤), ½ and ½¤ being the market clearing domestic
real rates of interest of the recipient and the donor. ~ E(¢) and ~ E¤(¢) are the intertemporal
expenditure functions in the two countries, where for a function f(¢), we denote by fi
its partial derivative with respect to its ith argument. These six equations can be solved
for P;p;½;½¤;W and W ¤ as functions of T. An important advantage of this approach is
that it shows explicitly the role of the domestic real rates of interest in both countries.
Its disadvantage, however, is that the utility levels in the two countries in each period
are treated implicitly. By contrast, our approach provides an explicit treatment of the
temporal utility levels, while leaving the real rates of interest implicit until we come to
(18) and (19) below.
Also note that in the representative consumer framework of our model, the volume
of transactions in the domestic capital markets is zero, while the domestic real rate of
interest adjusts to equate the intertemporal ‡ow of income to that of expenditure. The
real rate of interest is equal to the rate of time preference if the ‡ow of consumption is
the same in the two periods. As we shall see in section 3.2, the focus of our analysis is
on situations where the recipient’s period-one income (and consumption) is low relative to
that of period 2, resulting in the real rate of interest being greater than the rate of time
preference. With temporary aid, a recipient’s period-one consumption increases relative
to that of period two, lowering the real rate of interest towards the rate of time preference.
12Local Walrasian stability is assured when ~ Z, the slope of the world uncompensated
excess demand function is negative.
13While we assume that eE = 0 locally, it is important to note that, in general, con-
sumption experience in one period may a¤ect the value of e necessary to attain a particular
level of utility at any given set of prices. Thus Mansoorian (1993) and Obstfeld (1992)
assume that, at a given level of utility, e is an increasing function of the habitual standard
21of living. Alternatively, if consumption experience serves to enlighten the consumer by
revealing bene…cial characteristics of a commodity, it may serve to lower the amount of
expenditure needed to attain a given level of utility. Our assumption that eE = 0 enables
us to focus on the benchmark case where a transfer a¤ects welfare, as in the traditional
setting, only through its direct income and terms-of-trade e¤ects. If we assumed, instead,
eE < 0 (eE > 0) we would be stacking the cards in favor of (against) a welfare improvement
for the recipient country and the world economy as a whole.
14Simple substitution of Z will demonstrate that CY (Z + Z¤) + EPP(C ¤
Y ¡ CY ) =
CY (Z¤ ¡ RPP) + EP P(C¤
Y ). Positive values of C ¤
Y and CY guarantee that this expression
is negative.
15In a number of ways our model is very similar to the existing models which show
the possibility of transfer paradox and potential Pareto improvement (see, for example,
Bhagwati et al., 1985; Kemp, 1992; Turunen-Red and Woodland, 1988). There are two
important elements that our model has in common with these earlier contributions: The
presence of a distortion and what e¤ectively amounts to inferiority of one of the goods.
The market distortion in our model is the absence of international borrowing and lending
while the “good-will” or “habit-formation” e¤ect acts very much like inferiority of one
of the goods in earlier models. That is, a transfer in period one tends to reduce the
demand for the recipient’s export good in period two. What the present paper contributes
to the existing literature is an extension of the analysis to an intertemporal framework
where, unlike in a static setting, the role of impediments to international borrowing and
lending may be explicitly considered. Moreover, the intertemporal framework allows for
a distinction among temporary, permanent and expected future transfers. It is precisely
these features of the model that enable us to show how a temporary transfer may serve to
partly circumvent an existing distortion and thereby generate strict Pareto improvement.
16For evidence and analysis of interest rates in rural economies of developing countries
see, for example, Basu (1997, ch. 13) and Townsend (1994).
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